Security Model¶
This document describes Trustpoint’s security architecture, trust boundaries, authentication mechanisms, and security-relevant design decisions.
Trust Boundaries¶
NGINX forms the external network boundary, terminating TLS and forwarding authenticated requests to Django via HTTP on 127.0.0.1:8000.
flowchart LR
UNTRUSTED["Untrusted network / devices, browsers, API clients"]
subgraph TRUST_BOUNDARY[Trustpoint container]
NGINX["NGINX / :80 HTTP: CMP, CRL only / :443 HTTPS: all other traffic / TLS 1.2/1.3 / optional mTLS"]
GUNICORN["Gunicorn + Django / :8000 HTTP on loopback / trusted proxy headers"]
STATIC["Static files / /collected_static"]
end
DB[("PostgreSQL / 127.0.0.1:5432 / not externally reachable")]
HSM["HSM or PKCS#11 provider / local or network HSM"]
UNTRUSTED -->|HTTP| NGINX
UNTRUSTED -->|HTTPS + optional client cert| NGINX
NGINX -->|Serve| STATIC
NGINX -->|Proxy with SSL headers| GUNICORN
GUNICORN <--> DB
GUNICORN --> HSM
Security Boundaries¶
Boundary |
Role |
Key Controls |
|---|---|---|
NGINX Perimeter |
External network boundary |
TLS 1.2/1.3, strong ciphers, optional mTLS, HTTP only for CMP/CRL |
Trusted Proxy Headers |
Pass client cert metadata |
Headers set by NGINX only, Django trusts via |
PostgreSQL Isolation |
Database access control |
Listens on 127.0.0.1:5432 only, no external exposure |
HSM Access Control |
Cryptographic key protection |
PKCS#11 access restricted, PIN authentication, keys never exported in production |
File System Permissions |
Protect sensitive files |
Django runs as |
Headers passed by NGINX:
SSL-Client-Cert: Client certificate (PEM, URL-encoded)X-SSL-Client-Verify: Verification statusX-SSL-Client-S-DN: Client certificate subject DN
Upstream EST/CMP certificates undergo shared path validation before storage, including CA signing permissions, validity, path length, name constraints and critical extensions. Configured truststore entries are explicit CA trust anchors; response certificates cannot add trust. Unsupported certificate-policy constraints fail closed. Profile checks separately bind the issued key, identity and extensions to the authorized request; path validation does not fetch CRLs or OCSP responses.
Authentication Mechanisms¶
Web UI Authentication¶
Method: Django session-based authentication
Login:
/users/login/Security: HTTPS-only cookies, CSRF protection, Argon2 password hashing
Session timeout: Configurable
Password requirements: Minimum 8 characters, Django validators
REST API Authentication¶
Method: JWT (JSON Web Tokens) via
djangorestframework-simplejwtToken endpoints:
POST /rest/auth/login/,POST /rest/auth/refresh/Usage:
Authorization: Bearer <access_token>Token lifetime: Access 5min, Refresh 24h (configurable)
Security: Token rotation, blacklist support, audience/issuer validation
EST Protocol Authentication¶
Method |
Use Case |
Details |
|---|---|---|
HTTP Basic Auth |
Operator enrollment |
Username/password against Django user DB |
Client certificate |
Device authentication |
mTLS with IDevID, subject DN extraction |
Endpoints: /.well-known/est/<domain>/
CMP Protocol Authentication¶
Method |
Use Case |
Details |
|---|---|---|
Shared secret (PBMAC1) |
Bootstrap enrollment |
Pre-shared secret, one-time or per-device |
Client certificate |
Renewal/rekeying |
mTLS certificate-based |
Endpoints: /.well-known/cmp/<domain>/
Upstream CMP transactions currently use PBM shared-secret protection. Replies must authenticate and match the request’s transaction ID, nonces, operation and certificate request ID before status handling or certificate extraction. PBM work is bounded; unprotected replies and unsupported protection modes are rejected. TLS certificate verification remains disabled for these upstream connections.
Explicit CMP certificate confirmation¶
CMP responses advertise a persisted confirmation deadline; retries do not extend
it. TRUSTPOINT_CMP_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS defaults to 300 (must be positive).
TRUSTPOINT_CMP_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_POLICY selects revoke (default) or log
(retain the certificate), as allowed by
RFC 9483 §4.1.1.
Expiry rejects the transaction and invalidates initialization bootstrap secrets,
leaving onboarding pending. Late confirmations are rejected.
Apply migrations before deployment; existing pending confirmations receive a
five-minute grace period. Cleanup runs every minute through Django-Q (qcluster
with scheduling enabled), or run python trustpoint/manage.py expire_cmp_confirmations
from an external scheduler. Transaction lookups and secret rotation also trigger cleanup.
Other Protocols¶
AOKI: Protocol-specific bootstrap credentials
OPC UA GDS Push: Certificate-based with OPC UA security policies
Known Security Limitations¶
Audit trail: Logs not cryptographically signed or tamper-proof
Certificate Transparency: CT log submission not implemented
Multi-tenancy: No tenant isolation (separate instances required)
Key rollover: Manual CA key rotation requires downtime
Rate limiting: No built-in rate limiting (use reverse proxy)
Brute-force protection: No automatic account lockout
Security Best Practices¶
Use hardware HSM in production - SoftHSM for development only
Enable mutual TLS - Authenticate devices with certificates in sensitive environments
Rotate JWT tokens frequently - Keep access token lifetime short
Forward logs to SIEM - Enable centralized security monitoring
Encrypt database backups - Protect sensitive data at rest
Review approval workflows - Ensure proper segregation of duties
Keep software updated - Apply security patches promptly
Use strong passwords - Enforce complexity and rotation policies
Limit admin access - Apply principle of least privilege
Monitor certificate lifecycle - Alert on anomalous issuance or revocation patterns